Last content update and data verfication was on Wednesday, October 16, 2024, at 06:29:43 (America/New York — EST — UTC -5) by MEB MediaX Webmaster or authorized designee.
Details
- Mass Shooting
- Fort Hood
- Municipality
- Killeen
- State
- Texas – TX
- Zip Code
- 76544
- Region
- South
- Division
- West South Central
- Incident Date
- November 5, 2009
- Venue Type
- Military
- Killed
- 13
- Injured
- 43
Ranking Data
- Preventable Factors/Rankings
- Blatant Rankings - Points Doubled
- 6
- Preventable Rankings Score
- 21
- Preventable Status
- Largely Preventable
Preventable Factors
- Preventable Factor Details
Last content update and data verfication was on Wednesday, October 16, 2024, at 06:29:43 (America/New York — EST — UTC -5) by MEB MediaX Webmaster or authorized designee.
Takeaway(s):
—System failures, like breakdowns in communications and gross incompetence, can easily allow an incident to happen, as was the case with this one.
—Sailors and soldiers should be able to be armed while on any military base.
Incident Preventable Factor(s):
—Behavioral Red Flags Ignored/Response Delayed – Perpetrator Behavior Personally Erratic/Deviated from Individual/Societal Norms and Behavioral Red Flags Ignored/Response Delayed – Perpetrator Expressed Suicidal Ideation and/or Suicide by Police and/or Expressed Violent Intentions Privately and/or Publicly in Person and/or In Any Medium and Criminal Justice System Failures – Law Enforcement Failure – Delayed/Ignored/or No Follow-up to Telltale Perpetrator Event(s) Preceding Incident and Whatever System Failure – Whatever System Failure:
Editor’s Note:
Numerous sources recount the foregoing as they pertain to this incident, however, we’ve chosen the following for two reasons. First, it’s a highly authoritative source, and second, it’s years after the incident meaning calmer heads are prevailing and all the facts are in.
Testimony by the Honorable Michael T. McCaul – Chairman of the Subcommittee – Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management of the Committee on Homeland Security House of Representatives – One Hundred Twelfth Congress Second Session – September 14, 2012:
“You can see one of these soldiers on crutches. I asked him, ‘‘What did he say when he shot you?’’ ‘‘Congressman, he said ‘Allahu Akbar,’ ’’ God is great, the classic jihadist terminology. At that moment, I realized that this was not a workplace violence incident, that this was something more, that this was in fact an act of terrorism. I was criticized at the time for saying that. I think history will judge that as a correct assessment of what happened on that fateful day. Mr. Leiter, I want to start with you, because you headed the NCTC. You are really the expert at connecting the dots, and you did perform a masterful job while you were there. You and I worked with Joint Terrorism Task Forces. They have an enormous challenge, an enormous amount of data that comes through, and many of which, if you miss one thread of evidence, you can be held accountable by Members of Congress like myself at a later hearing. But these emails, the 18 emails that took place, when we were briefed by senior intelligence officials—and they wouldn’t give us the content, they would just simply say—the only word I can use is downplay the significance of these emails. Finally, when the good work of the Webster report revealed these emails publicly, we all had a chance to actually read the content. The one that I described in my opening statement on May 31, 2009, Major Hasan, he almost seems to be telegraphing exactly what he is getting ready to do, almost asking for permission from al-Awlaki in Yemen, is it okay for a suicide bomber to kill soldiers and innocent civilians in the cause to protect our fellow brothers? You know, you and I have worked in law enforcement. This is one of 18. The other one, ‘‘keep me on your Rolodex,’’ you know, to me, this is a huge flag. It was a big deal in San Diego. The San Diego Joint Terrorism Task Force thought, wow, there is something wrong going on here. We need to start—let’s send a lead to WFO. Let’s have them investigate. The response from WFO is astounding, that, well, we don’t really see a terrorist threat here; and they basically shut down this investigation until 5 months later when Major Hasan kills 13 people, 12 soldiers. There is a Department of Defense official on the Joint Terrorism Task Force, and yet that official didn’t contact Fort Hood. Maybe it is the legal restrictions that you are talking about. If so, we need to change that. There were so many flags not only between the FBI two offices— and I really commend the San Diego office for their courage and bravery of trying to get to the bottom of this. I fault the WFO office for not following up on this. In the military, the way they passed this guy along, knowing he is proselytizing radical Islam with a business card: Soldier of Allah. He is enraging his colleagues. What do they do? They don’t want to deal with the problem. They want to pass him along, promote him, send him down to Fort Hood. So many flags in this case. The dots were identified, but they weren’t shared. How did this happen?”
“… I think this case, though, I would make the argument is a little different. You have got a major on a base, Fort Hood, who is talking to a cleric, who there was some evidence may even have had ties to the 9/11 hijackers, for God’s sake, and he is really rising in stature to becoming the No. 2 in the world, next to bin Laden. I think, unfortunately, WFO only gets two emails. They don’t get the May 31 email that clearly outlines what his intentions are and what he is planning to do. You are right, Professor, San Diego has it, though; and they have DOD employees on these task forces. You know, why didn’t one of those at least contact Fort Hood? Why didn’t anybody contact Fort Hood and say, you know what, there is an issue here? You got a problem. You got a guy that could actually kill somebody, you know. I don’t think any of you really have the answer to that. I don’t have the answer to that. It is just unfortunate that it didn’t happen in this case. …”
“… So, with that, I again want to focus back to what this hearing is all about, and that is Fort Hood. Now, my question may go outside of your expertise or ability to comment. But, again, in this case I think you had a huge breakdown in information sharing, not only between the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] within 46 itself but also with the Department of Defense. If you can speak to these issues, I would like to know how to fix this. First, you have got an agent sitting at WFO who sits on this matter for the maximum amount of time possible, looks at the lead on the very last day. I understand the FBI is swamped. They have a lot on their plate. But when you have a major at Fort Hood who is the subject matter, I think that would take a little higher priority. But they wait until the very last day and within 4 hours make an analysis based upon two of 18 emails because this analyst doesn’t know how to access the database that would give him the other 16 emails, one of which, as I mentioned previously, telegraphs what he is getting ready to do. So you have got that breakdown. Then, you know, finally, within these task forces you actually have Department of Defense representatives. Why on either side, both from Washington or San Diego, in your opinion—and maybe you can’t speak to this—but why didn’t one of those DoD representatives on the JTTFs contact Fort Hood and say, you got a problem?” 1
Editor’s Note:
It should be noted that the system failures in this case are particularly egregious because the perpetrator was a member of the United States Army. “When the U.S. military is a party to cases centering on First Amendment rights to free speech, free press, and free exercise of religion, the [United States] Supreme Court generally defers to the government’s interest and discretion, permitting the military to restrict the rights of service personnel in ways it does not permit in civilian contexts. The U.S. military has always operated as a somewhat distinct society governed by its own criminal code. It is currently ruled by a special system of laws, primarily the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ),and has its own system for prosecuting violations of the code, including courts-martial. When responding to First Amendment challenges from military personnel, the Court consistently treats the military as a special and separate context or environment in which standard First Amendment protections do not apply, or do not apply to the same extent … .” 2 Therefore the degree to which the United States Army could have and should intervened is far greater than if the perpetrator was a civilian.
Two Preventable Factors/Rankings (the second and third listed) for this incident are deemed blatant and therefore the ranking points have been doubled.
—Venue Lacked Armed Individuals/Personnel – Venue Lacked Armed Individuals (Civilians)/Personnel (Military/Police/Security):
You would think on a military base there will be a lot of armed personnel. However, generally speaking sailors and soldiers aren’t allowed to be armed while on a military base, at least one that’s in the United States. In fact, three of those killed (one civilian and two military personnel) were killed while trying to charge the perpetrator. 3 Like we have consistently states, armed personnel, good guys with guns, need to be in every venue.
Source(s):
1. None. 2013. “Lessons From Fort Hood: Improving Our Ability to Connect the Dots – Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management of the Committee on Homeland Security House of Representatives – One Hundred Twelfth Congress Second Session – September 14, 2012”. U.S. Government Printing Office. Retrieved May 27, 2021, from https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg81127/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg81127.pdf.
2. Beaumont, Elizabeth. None. “Rights of Military Personnel”. The First Amendment Encyclopedia. Retrieved May 28, 2021, from https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1131/rights-of-military-personnel.
3. None. Last Edited May 16, 2021. “2009 Fort Hood Shooting”. Wikipedia. Retereived May 27, 2021, from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2009_Fort_Hood_shooting.
Fluidity
- Criminal Case Pending?
- Civil Litigation Pending?
- Trending
- ⯀
Administrative Information
- Credible Source Inquires?
- 3
- Are Credible Source Inquires Inline Endnotes?
- Assessment Status?
- Complete
- Editorial Board Approval?
Record Information
- Last Updated
- Lexar
- Record ID
- 13
- Private ID
- 9J3W7AC
- Date Recorded
- 2021-05-27 19:10:35
- Date Updated
- 2023-10-24 02:00:45
- Last Accessed
- Type Designation